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LEAVE IT TO BEAVER MEETS MODERN FAMILY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF L.F. V. BREIT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
CHANGING FAMILY 
Joshua K. Drysdale† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The definition of ‘‘family’’ is changing in American society, and children are 
helplessly caught in the crossfire. America’s family unit is shifting from a Leave 
it to Beaver1 traditional family unit to one more accurately depicted in the hit-
show Modern Family.2 In an age when divorce is more and more common,3 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10; J.D. Candidate, Liberty 
University School of Law, 2016; B.S. in Government, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 2007. I thank 
my beautiful wife, Lindsay, for her unfailing love and support; my kids for reminding me 
what’s important (‘‘babies, blankies, and books’’); my parents for showing me what a family 
should be; and my Savior, Jesus Christ, without whom all hope is lost and through whom 
eternal life is freely given. Romans 10:13. 
 1. Leave it to Beaver, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050032/ (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2015) (involving the ‘‘All-American’’ traditional family unit). 
 2. Modern Family: Plot Summary, IMDB.COM, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1442437/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015) (involving divorce, rebellious children, and homosexual parenting).  
 3. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintains the National Vital 
Statistics System which tracks national marriage and divorce rate trends based on State records. 
Due to ‘‘[l]imitations in the information collected by the States as well as budgetary 
considerations[,]’’ the CDC stopped collecting detailed data for the total numbers and rates of 
marriages and divorces throughout the United States. See CDC, MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/mardiv.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). As such, the divorce rates the 
CDC produces are littered with fallacies. That said, according to the CDC, 6.8 people out of 1,000 
were married in 2011 (not including statistics from Louisiana), but 3.6 marriages out of 1,000 faced 
divorce or annulments in 2011 (not including statistics from California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Louisiana, and Minnesota). CDC, NATIONAL MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATE TRENDS, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). The 
United States Census Bureau also tracks marriage and divorce rates, but does so through survey, 
not official records. CDC, MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/mardiv.htm (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2015). Many of the surveys conducted by the Census Bureau only track data for 
the particular year in question, i.e. the divorce rate of 9.2 among men and 9.7 among women in 
2009 only accounts for the men and women who actually got a divorce in 2009; it does not account 
for the total number of marriages that have ended in divorce prior to and including 2009. See 
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL EVENTS OF AMERICANS: 2009, 3 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-13.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). Given the statistical 
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children born out of wedlock are more prevalent,4 same-sex couples have 
growing ‘‘families,’’5 and artificial procreation methods are far more prevalent,6 
it is vitally important that we understand the nature of the ‘‘modern family.’’  
This change in society’s view of the ‘‘family’’ is evident not only in society 
at large, but also in the courtroom. In Kansas, a sperm donor who provided 
sperm in a cup to a lesbian couple after reading their listing on Craigslist was 
ordered to pay child support to the biological mother after the two women 
split up nearly five years later.7 In Michigan, a wife with no biological relation 
to her husband’s child was given custody of the child after her husband died 
because the biological mother had a history of drug abuse, lived in an abusive 
home, and tested positive for cocaine on the day of the evidentiary hearing.8 
In Pennsylvania, trial courts are not allowed to consider the effects of 
homosexual parenting in custody cases unless specific facts of the case point 
to an adverse effect on the children.9 These are just a few examples of the 
cases courts are hearing.10 Further, despite the efforts of some state 
                                                                                                                                      
flaws, it is difficult to determine an exact divorce rate in the United States, which is a matter of 
concern in and of itself. See infra Part III.B.1.a. Some organizations cite the divorce rates as high 
as 40-50%. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE, 
http://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). Contra Brittany Wong, The Truth 
About the Divorce Rate is Surprisingly Optimistic, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/02/divorce-rate-declining-_n_6256956.html (claiming 
the divorce rate is actually dropping, but still acknowledging that, at its current ‘‘trend,’’ nearly 33% 
of marriages will end in divorce).  
 4. The current ‘‘proportion of all births to unmarried women’’ in 2012 was 40.7% and 
included significant increases among certain racial groups. NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS 
REPORTS, BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2012, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_03.pdf (last visited on Jan. 24, 2015). 
 5. A 2013 study estimated that 111,000 same-sex couples were raising approximately 
170,000 children at that time. Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW: THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (2013), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf. 
 6. See generally Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, AM. EXPERIENCE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/babies/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2015). 
 7. Chandrika Narayan, Kansas Court Says Sperm Donor Must Pay Child Support, 
CNN.COM (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/justice/kansas-sperm-donation/. 
 8. Kane v. Anjoski (In re Anjoski), 770 N.W.2d 1, 5-8 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
 9. M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 17-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). Of special note, the long-
term effects of homosexual parenting are potentially substantial, but difficult to prove with 
specific facts of each particular case at a particular moment in time. See infra Part III.B.1.c. 
 10. These examples are obviously just a minor sampling of the daily challenges family law 
courts across the country face. The problem is not limited to the United States. The United 
Kingdom is on its way, at the time of this publication, to legalizing the artificial production of 
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legislatures to protect the Leave it to Beaver traditional family,11 the United 
States Supreme Court recently held that homosexual couples have a 
‘‘fundamental right to marry in all States.’’12 
These changing concepts of family present unique challenges for courts, 
which are tasked with navigating between changing social views on family 
and reproduction on the one hand, and the practical considerations of 
biological parentage, parental rights, and child well-being on the other. In 
2013, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided a case that involved the 
interplay of several of these changing circumstances. Before exploring the 
facts and analysis of this case, however, picture this scenario. 
Dan and Susan have been dating for six years. Due to Dan’s intense social 
phobias and fear of formal settings, they have never ‘‘tied the knot.’’ For all 
intents and purposes, however, they live as a married couple. They own a 
home where they both reside, have a monogamous intimate relationship, 
have joint bank accounts, and even have a family dog, Fido. For whatever 
reason, they also both wear wedding bands, presumably to ward off potential 
suitors. The fact remains, however, that they have never been legally married. 
For the past four years, Dan and Susan have been actively trying to 
conceive a child. Unfortunately, their attempts have proven unsuccessful. 
Finally, Dan and Susan have decided that artificial insemination may be the 
answer to their childless woes. Unable to afford formal fertility treatment, 
Dan and Susan read about at-home artificial insemination techniques and 
decide to give it a try.13 Each attempt has involved Dan’s sperm. After a few 
months, Susan becomes pregnant. The couple is overjoyed and they begin 
preparations to welcome their new child into the world. They send baby 
announcements to all of their friends and family. Susan’s friends throw her a 
baby shower, and Dan is relieved to discover that most everything they need 
for the new baby has been given to them. They attend prenatal doctor 
appointments together, even if Dan has to miss work to do so. Nine months 
later, Dan and Susan welcome a bouncing baby boy into the world. Life could 
not be better. 
Dan and Susan continue life as usual after Timmy is born. Timmy has his 
own room in Dan and Susan’s home and lives as any happy boy should. Dan 
                                                                                                                                      
embryos using three different biological parents. See James Gallagher, MPs Say Yes to Three-
Person Babies, BBC.COM (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-31069173. 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).   
 13. These at-home inseminations are actually quite common. See At Home Artificial 
Insemination to Get Pregnant -- Turkey Baster Method, BABYMED.COM, 
http://www.babymed.com/home-artificial-insemination-get-pregnant-turkey-baster-method 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2015). 
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and Susan have recovered from the sleep deprivation and everything is going 
well. Four more years pass and Susan suddenly decides she’s bored with her 
life. In a mindless search for adventure, she meets another man and runs off 
into the sunset with him, taking Timmy with her. Dan immediately seeks out 
an attorney to help him get Timmy back. Unfortunately for Dan, the process 
takes longer than he expected. Though his heart breaks daily over the loss of 
his son, he decides to try and meet another woman. Eventually, he meets 
someone else, gets over his fear of formal settings and decides to get married, 
and he and his new wife have twins. Meanwhile, Susan continues to avoid 
Dan at all costs, has left her one-night-stand boyfriend, and has started 
stripping to afford food for her and Timmy.  
Despite his new marriage, Dan still passionately pursues custody of 
Timmy. Finally, Dan’s attorney calls with the bad news. Virginia law does not 
consider Dan to be Timmy’s father because Timmy was conceived using 
artificial insemination to get Susan pregnant while Dan and Susan were not 
married.14 The attorney also informs Dan that since Dan and Susan never 
signed a contract stating that each of them would accept parental 
responsibilities for Timmy, Virginia law does not consider Dan to be 
Timmy’s father. Dan is blindsided. Why would he think, in the midst of all 
the joy of welcoming his son into the world with his long-time love, to sign a 
contract with his partner and mother of his child? Since the attorney loves 
giving bad news, he also informs Dan that, even if Dan and Susan had signed 
this contract, Virginia courts would not be required to consider his current 
marital status, or Susan’s lack thereof, when deciding whether Timmy can 
come back home with Dan.  
This hypothetical is, unfortunately, all too real, for under current Virginia 
law the result is most likely to be the same.15 In L.F. v. Breit, the court 
considered whether a man who donated his sperm to a woman with whom 
he was involved in a long-term relationship could pursue custody of the child 
conceived through artificial insemination after his relationship with the 
mother ended and the mother attempted to break all contact between him 
and the child.16 This case, and the dicta included in the decision, has 
potentially lasting impacts on the way our judicial system decides intricate 
and delicate custody and visitation issues. In this note, I will highlight the 
case law and statutory history that predated Breit, evaluate the court’s 
decision based on competing societal interests in preserving the family unit 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. See infra Part III.A. 
 15. The facts have been slightly changed from the actual Breit case to allow for a more 
thorough analysis of Virginia law on the topic. 
 16. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 170-72 (2013). 
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and parental rights, and expand on two scenarios the court suggested would 
have changed the outcome of Breit: (i) a situation in which a written 
agreement had not been signed by both biological parents, or (ii) a change in 
marital status of either biological parent.17 Finally, I recommend that the 
General Assembly consider changing Virginia law to incorporate clear and 
convincing evidence as a standard to establish paternity and require courts 
to consider the marital and familial status of individuals seeking custody and 
visitation of children.  These recommendations fail to address the underlying 
problem of the crumbling traditional family unit, but both have the potential 
to salvage some aspects of it.  
II.  BACKGROUND: TRACING THE STEPS FROM SUPREME  
COURT DECISIONS TO L.F. V. BREIT 
Pivotal to a proper understanding of Breit is a complete understanding of 
the development of parental rights as recognized by the courts and how those 
conflict with or complement the preservation of the traditional family unit. 
The United States Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that 
parental rights are fundamental.18 The Supreme Court of Virginia has 
addressed fundamental parental rights in the context of the state’s 
‘‘significant interest in encouraging the institution of marriage.’’19 The 
Virginia General Assembly has also expressed the same interests.20 
A. Case Law: The ‘‘Family’’ According to the Courts 
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions 
a. Meyer v. Nebraska 
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court held that parental rights were 
fundamental under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.21 Meyer considered the State of Nebraska’s ability to restrict 
teaching in any school, private or public, to occur only in the English 
language prior to the student’s attaining and passing the eighth grade.22 Mr. 
Meyer was accused of violating a 1919 Nebraska state law that imposed this 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. Id. at 183 n.8, 184-85. 
 18. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 19. Breit, 285 Va. at 181. 
 20. See infra Part II.B. 
 21. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 309, 399-400 (1923). 
 22. Id. at 396-97. 
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restriction after he taught a ten year-old to read German.23 In holding that 
the statute violated the Due Process Clause,24 the Court cited one’s right to 
‘‘establish a home and bring up children’’ as a ‘‘liberty’’ protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.25 The Court further alluded to this fundamental 
right in holding that parents had the power to monitor the education ‘‘of their 
own [children].’’26  
b. Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
Two years later, the Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Pierce. In 
that case, an Oregon statute mandated that ‘‘every parent, guardian, or other 
person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and 
sixteen years . . . send him ‘to a public school for the period of time a public 
school shall be held during the current year’ in the district where the child 
reside[d] . . . .’’27 The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation that 
provided care for orphans and education for youth.28 It maintained valuable 
facilities for its services, and the education it provided mirrored that taught 
in Oregon public schools.29 The Compulsory Education Act of 1922, 
however, caused the Society to lose students to the public school system who 
would have otherwise continued using the Society’s programs.30 In holding 
the statute unconstitutional, the Court reasoned, 
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska . . . we think it entirely 
plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by 
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of 
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes 
any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The 
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 402. 
 25. Id. at 399. 
 26. Id. at 401. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 27. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
 28. Id. at 531. 
 29. Id. at 532. 
 30. Id. 
2015] LEAVE IT TO BEAVER MEETS MODERN FAMILY 51 
 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.31 
c. Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
If there is any case that shows the progression of the modern family in real 
time, it is Michael H. The case involved the marriage of Carole D. and Gerald 
D., which occurred on May 9, 1976.32 The couple lived together in Playa del 
Rey, California. During the summer of 1978, Carole D. began having an 
extramarital affair with Michael H., the couple’s neighbor.33 On May 11, 1981, 
Carole D. gave birth to a baby girl, Victoria D.34 Even though Gerald was 
listed as ‘‘father’’ on the birth certificate, Carole D. informed Michael that she 
thought he was Victoria’s biological father.35 Unfortunately for Victoria, ‘‘[i]n 
the first three years of her life, [she] remained always with Carole, but found 
herself within a variety of quasifamily units.’’36 
Michael attempted to visit Victoria, but was prevented from doing so.37 He 
subsequently filed a filiation action in a California Superior Court in order to 
‘‘establish his paternity and right to visitation.’’38 Over the course of the 
following months, several complaints and motions were filed by all parties 
involved, including Victoria through her court-appointed guardian ad 
litem.39 In the meantime, Carole moved back to New York to live with Gerald, 
but then quickly went back to California to be with Michael.40 During part of 
the litigation, Michael lived with Carole and Victoria in Los Angeles and held 
                                                                                                                                      
 31. Id. at 534-35 (emphasis added). 
 32. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 113-14. 
 36. Id. at 114 (‘‘In October 1981, Gerald moved to New York City to pursue his business 
interests, but Carole chose to remain in California. At the end of that month, Carole and 
Michael had blood tests of themselves and Victoria, which showed a 98.07% probability that 
Michael was Victoria’s father. In January 1982, Carole visited Michael in St. Thomas, where 
his primary business interests were based. There Michael held Victoria out as his child. In 
March, however, Carole left Michael and returned to California, where she took up residence 
with yet another man, Scott K. Later that spring, and again in the summer, Carole and Victoria 
spent time with Gerald in New York City, as well as on vacation in Europe. In the fall, they 
returned to Scott in California.’’). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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Victoria out to be his daughter.41 After signing a ‘‘stipulation that Michael 
was Victoria’s natural father,’’ Carole left Michael and instructed her 
attorneys not to file the stipulation.42 The following month, Carole and 
Gerald resumed their relationship and, as of the time of the case, had two 
more children.43  
The Superior Court granted a motion for summary judgment in January 
1985, brought by Gerald after Michael was awarded limited visitation 
privileges pendente lite prior to Carole and Gerald resuming their 
relationship.44 Gerald claimed the California Evidence Code eliminated any 
dispute as to Victoria’s father since it provided that, ‘‘the issue of a wife 
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively 
presumed to be a child of the marriage.’’45  
In February 1988, after a series of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court noted 
probable jurisdiction and, in denying Michael parental rights, stated that, 
‘‘the Due Process Clause affords only those protections so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’’ and 
that its ‘‘cases reflect[ed] continual insistence upon respect for the teaching 
of history and solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society . 
. . .’’46 The Court alluded to its supposed desire to maintain the integrity of 
the family unit by framing the issue before the Court as ‘‘whether the 
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has 
been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our 
society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special 
protection.’’47 Ultimately, the Court concluded that it had not been 
traditionally protected, and that Michael’s assertion of parental rights of 
Victoria did not stand.48  
2. Supreme Court of Virginia Decisions 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has also explicitly recognized the 
fundamental right to parent one’s child. In Wyatt v. McDermott, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia answered certified questions from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 114-15. 
 43. Id. at 115. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 46. Id. at 122-23 (internal citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 124. 
 48. Id. 
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regarding whether Virginia recognized tortious interference with parental 
rights as a cause of action.49 Answering in the affirmative, the court 
recognized parental rights as ‘‘constitutionally protected,’’ of ‘‘essential 
value,’’ and ‘‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized . . . .’’50 
Unfortunately, the best interests of children and the fundamental rights 
enjoyed by their parents are typically at odds in custody and visitation cases. 
Since parental rights are fundamental, they seem to trump the desire the 
court may have to protect children and the family unit.  
a. Bottoms v. Bottoms  
In Bottoms v. Bottoms, the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed the 
interplay between parental rights and the well-being of children in the way 
society would expect the decision to be made: in the best interest of the child. 
Bottoms involved a custody dispute between the maternal grandmother and 
the child’s mother.51 Sharon, the child’s mother, dropped out of high school 
and lived at various homes of relatives and a short-term husband (the child’s 
father).52 Following the couple’s divorce, Sharon was awarded custody of the 
child, but continued her destructive lifestyle.53 After a series of court hearings 
and multiple rulings, the Supreme Court of Virginia eventually held that the 
grandmother----who cared for the child for most of the child’s life----should 
be given custody of the child.54 In doing so, the court stated that Virginia law 
creates a ‘‘strong’’ presumption that a child’s best interest will be served when 
the child is in the custody of the his parents.55 The court went on to conclude, 
however, that ‘‘when the contest is between parent and non-parent, this rule 
is conditioned upon the principle that a parent’s rights ‘are to be respected if 
at all consonant with the best interests of the child.’’’56 In granting custody to 
the grandmother, the court acknowledged that parental rights can be 
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child 
                                                                                                                                      
 49. Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 685, 689 (2012). 
 50. Id. at 692 (internal citations omitted). 
 51. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410, 412 (1995). 
 52. Id. at 414. 
 53. Id. The case goes on to cite Sharon’s multiple sexual relationships over time (which 
led to a venereal disease that prevented her from having any future children) in the same room 
where the child’s crib was kept, her ‘‘temper’’ that resulted in physical abuse to the child, and 
her eventual lesbian relationship with a ‘‘recovering alcoholic’’ woman recently discharged 
from the U.S. Army (the child was ten months old at this point in time). Id. at 414-15.  
 54. Id. at 421. 
 55. Id. at 413 (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 413-14 (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399 (1972)). 
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are served by awarding custody to someone other than the biological 
parents.57 
b. Griffin v. Griffin 
In Griffin v. Griffin, Mrs. Griffin (‘‘wife’’) gave birth to a child and 
presumed the child was Mr. Griffin’s (‘‘husband’’) child. In actuality, the wife 
had had an extramarital affair with a Mr. Groh, who was the child’s actual 
father.58 During the pregnancy and throughout the child’s first year-and-a-
half of life, the wife and husband assumed the child was the husband’s and 
the husband cared for the child as his own.59 In December 1999, a court-
ordered paternity test identified Mr. Groh as the father.60 Upon this 
discovery, the wife ‘‘denied husband any further . . . visitation with her son.’’61 
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (‘‘JDR court’’) awarded 
husband temporary visitation rights despite the results of the paternity test.62 
The JDR court subsequently expanded the visitation schedule and made its 
order final, citing the best interest of the child.63 Mr. Groh eventually testified 
at trial that, while he paid child support, he ‘‘did not intend to foster a 
relationship with the child.’’64 The court of appeals reversed and vacated the 
trial court’s visitation order.65 The court of appeals held that the wife’s 
fundamental right to raise her son took priority over the best interests of her 
son.66 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. Id. at 413. The court defined clear and convincing evidence as ‘‘the measure or degree 
of proof that will produce . . . a firm belief or conviction upon the allegations sought to be 
established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the degree 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . it does not mean clear and unequivocal.’’ Id. It is 
interesting to note here that the court recognized the strong presumption towards parental 
rights, but applied a clear and convincing evidence standard to rebut that presumption. Of 
course, this seems to make sense in the context of the well-being of a child. ‘‘[W]hile the legal 
rights of a parent should be respected in a custody proceeding, those technical rights may be 
disregarded if demanded by the interests of the child.’’ Id. at 419. 
 58. Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 79 (2003). 
 59. Id. at 79-80. 
 60. Id. at 80. 
 61. Id. Prior to this paternity test, wife took the child and moved to wife’s mother’s house, 
but allowed weekly child visitation with husband. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 86. 
 66. Evidence introduced at trial suggested that husband had a ‘‘history of drinking’’ and 
often argued with wife in front of the child out of a sense of betrayal. Id. at 80. 
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Citing Williams v. Williams, the court of appeals held that, ‘‘for the 
constitutional requirement to be satisfied, before visitation can be ordered 
over the objection of the child’s parents, a court must find an actual harm to 
the child’s health or welfare without such visitation.’’67 The court seemed to 
disregard the preservation of the marital unit and held that ‘‘a very different 
kind of legal contest . . . exists in a dispute between a fit parent and a non-
parent.’’68 The court seemed to disregard the husband and wife’s marriage in 
the determination of the best interest of the child. In fact, the court compared 
husband’s involvement in the child’s life to one of a seemingly flippant third-
party. The court held that denying the husband visitation of the child would 
undoubtedly cause ‘‘some measure of sadness and a sense of loss,’’ but that 
those emotional responses did not rise to the level of ‘‘actual harm’’ to the 
child.69 The court concluded that if this sadness and emotional attachment 
classified as actual harm, ‘‘any non-parent who ha[d] developed an 
emotionally enduring relationship with another’s child would satisfy the 
actual-harm requirement. The constitutional rights of parents cannot be so 
easily undermined.’’70 While the court’s reasoning makes sense for the 
neighbor across the street creating an emotional bond with someone else’s 
child, it seems out of place in Griffin. The court was not deciding whether 
Jane Doe, the hypothetical neighbor across the street who took an emotional 
interest in Junior, gets visitation rights; the court was dealing with a married 
couple (albeit in a rocky marriage) that believed the child to be theirs for a 
year-and-a-half of the child’s life.71 
Finally, the court touched on an area that this note will discuss in greater 
detail below.72 In rejecting the husband’s suggestion that the wife’s marital 
status should be considered when evaluating the best interest of the child, the 
court held,  
We are equally unpersuaded by husband’s suggestion that wife has 
no constitutionally protected rights as a parent because she and 
the child’s father cannot be considered an ‘‘intact family.’’ [Troxel 
v. Granville] involved an unmarried, single mother. Nothing in 
Troxel implies that the legal superiority of a fit parent’s rights over 
those of a non-parent turns on whether the parent is married, 
separated, divorced, or widowed. A single mother has no less 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. at 83 (emphasis in original) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 22 (1998)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 85-86. 
 70. Id. at 86. 
 71. Id. at 80. 
 72. See infra Part IV.B. 
56 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:45 
 
constitutional right to parent her son than a married mother. We, 
therefore, reject any argument that single parents are entitled to 
less constitutional liberty in decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of their children.73 
B. Legislation: The ‘‘Family’’ According to the Assembly 
Several Virginia statutes are discussed in Breit and are worth mentioning 
in detail here. The interplay between these statutes makes up a significant 
part of the Breit decision.74 As the court outlines, the court must ‘‘construe 
these linked statutes that address the same subject matter ‘so as to avoid 
repugnance and conflict between them.’’’75 Further, these statutes must be 
read in conjunction with one another as ‘‘consistent and harmonious’’ to give 
meaning to the ‘‘overall statutory scheme.’’76 The Breit court goes to great 
lengths to ensure these seemingly conflicting statutes are read in a manner 
consistent with each other.77 
1. Va. Code § 20-49.1 
The Breit court goes into great detail regarding the legislative history of 
VA. CODE § 20-49.1 (hereinafter ‘‘Parentage Statute’’).78 Citing the common 
law, the court acknowledged that there was no historical duty of an 
unmarried father to support his biological children.79 In 1952, however, 
Virginia’s General Assembly statutorily modified the common law and 
allowed proof of paternity to establish that duty, but only by the father’s 
admission of paternity via a sworn statement in court.80 This policy was 
further expanded in 1954 to include out-of-court admissions.81 In 1988, the 
statute was labeled ‘‘How parent child relationship established,’’ and 
amended to state that paternity could be established by a voluntary written 
agreement, made under oath, of the biological father and mother.82 In 1992, 
                                                                                                                                      
 73. Griffin, 41 Va. App. at 84 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 174-84 (2013). 
 75. Id. at 178 (internal citations omitted). 
 76. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 77. Id. at 176-80. 
 78. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (1988). 
 79. Breit, 285 Va. at 174. 
 80. Id. The original statutory revision was codified as VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1, but was 
re-codified to § 20-49.1 in 1988. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
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the statute allowed for genetic testing to establish paternity.83 In its current 
state, the Parentage Statute provides that the parent-child relationship 
between a child and a woman may be established, prima facie, by proof that 
the woman gave birth to the child.84 For a man, however, the statute provides 
different avenues to establish the parent and child relationship: (1) 
scientifically reliable genetic testing that affirms at least a ninety-eight 
percent probability of paternity, (2) a voluntary written statement of the 
father and mother made under oath acknowledging paternity, or (3) as 
otherwise provided in the chapter.85 
2. Va. Code § 20-158 
Commonly referred to as the Assisted Conception Statute, VA. CODE § 20-
158(A) discusses parentage of a child resulting from assisted conception.86 
The statute was passed in response to Welborn v. Doe87 and was enacted 
‘‘specifically to protect the interests of married parents.’’88 In doing so, the 
General Assembly sought to ensure that ‘‘infertile married couples such as 
the Welborn’s . . . were not threatened by parentage claims from third-party 
donors’’ and could ‘‘obtain sperm from an outside donor without fear that 
the donor would claim parental rights.’’89 The statute generally provides that 
(1) the gestational mother of a child is the child’s mother, (2) the husband of 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. Id. 
 84. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(A) (1988). 
 85. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(B)(1)-(3) (1988). The statute also provides that the written 
agreement, in addition to acknowledging paternity, must also ‘‘confirm[] that prior to signing 
the acknowledgment, the parties were provided with a written and oral description of the 
rights and responsibilities of acknowledging paternity and the consequences arising from a 
signed acknowledgment, including the right to rescind.’’ Id. § 20-49.1(B)(2). The statute goes 
on to address the rescission of the acknowledgment and the legal effect of such 
acknowledgment. Id. The ‘‘otherwise provided by this chapter’’ ambiguity is discussed below. 
See infra Part II.V. 
 86. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (1991). 
 87. Welborn v. Doe, 10 Va. App. 631 (1990). Welborn involved a married couple that gave 
birth to a child using artificial insemination and an unknown third party’s sperm. Id. at 633. 
The court considered ‘‘whether a man . . . may adopt a child born to his wife by artificial 
insemination with a third party donor’s sperm,’’ and determined that he could. Id. at 632. In 
holding such, however, the court also held that the sperm donor’s rights were not terminated 
under then VA. CODE §§ 32.1-257 and 64.1-7.1 by the mere fact that the biological mother and 
her husband were married. Welborn, 10 Va. App. at 634. ‘‘Until such time as the Code is 
amended to terminate possible parental rights of a sperm donor, only through adoption may 
the rights of the sperm donor be divested . . . .’’ Id. at 635. 
 88. Breit, 285 Va. at 175. 
 89. Id.  
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the gestational mother of the child is the child’s father, and (3) a donor is not 
the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, unless the donor 
is the husband of the gestational mother.90 While enacted to protect married 
couples from outside interference in their familial relationships, the statute 
created a loop-hole that fails to protect consenting, but unmarried, adults 
who use artificial insemination to get pregnant. While the courts have 
acknowledged the ‘‘significant interest in encouraging the institution of 
marriage,’’91 this statute leaves a gaping hole that can easily be taken 
advantage of in today’s modern family structure. Further, on its face this 
statute seems to conflict with the Parentage Statute92 since it relies on the 
marital status of the mother to determine the identity of the father, not 
genetic testing or a written acknowledgment of paternity. This seeming 
contradiction, however, is remedied in Breit and discussed further below.93 
3. VA. CODE § 20-124.3 
Virginia’s General Assembly has developed ten factors that the courts 
must consider when determining the best interests of a child for the purposes 
of determining custody or visitation arrangements.94 Under VA. CODE § 20-
124.3 (hereinafter ‘‘Best Interest Statute’’), these factors include: 
(1) The age and physical and mental condition of the child, 
giving due consideration to the child’s changing 
developmental needs; 
(2) The age and physical and mental condition of each parent; 
(3) The relationship existing between each parent and each child, 
giving due consideration to the positive involvement with the 
child’s life, the ability to accurately assess and meet the 
emotional, intellectual and physical needs of the child; 
(4) The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other 
important relationships of the child, including but not 
limited to siblings, peers and extended family members; 
(5) The role that each parent has played and will play in the 
future, in the upbringing and care of the child; 
                                                                                                                                      
 90. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (1991); Breit, 285 Va. at 175-177. The statute provides some 
exceptions for the husband of the gestational mother, but those exceptions are not applicable 
here. 
 91. Breit, 285 Va. at 181. 
 92. See supra Part II.B.1.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (1988). 
 93. See supra Part II.C. 
 94. See Young v. Forrest, No. 1435-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 296 (May 29, 2001). 
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(6) The propensity of each parent to actively support the child’s 
contact and relationship with the other parent, including 
whether a parent has unreasonably denied the other parent 
access to or visitation with the child; 
(7) The relative willingness and demonstrated ability of each 
parent to maintain a close and continuing relationship with 
the child, and the ability of each parent to cooperate in and 
resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the child; 
(8) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the 
child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and 
experience to express such a preference; 
(9) Any history of family abuse as that term is defined in § 16.1-
228 or sexual abuse. If the court finds such a history, the court 
may disregard the factors in subdivision 6; and 
(10) Such other factors as the court deems necessary and proper 
to the determination.95 
As we will see, these factors were not considered in the Breit decision and 
understandably so. Breit was concerned with whether Mr. Breit could pursue 
custody of L.F. at all, not whether he was granted custody.96 That said, the 
Breit court alluded to these factors in footnote eight of the case and suggested 
an addition to these factors that should be given careful thought.97 
C. L.F. v. Breit: A Forced Interplay Between Case Law and Legislation 
The case law and statutory history intersected in L.F. v. Breit. The Supreme 
Court of Virginia heard a case regarding Ms. Beverly Mason and Mr. William 
Breit.98 The two were involved in a long-term relationship and lived together 
for several years as an unmarried couple.99 Although they wanted to have a 
child together, their attempts to conceive a child naturally failed and they 
were forced to seek reproductive assistance from a board-certified fertility 
doctor.100 After two cycles of in vitro fertilization using Breit’s sperm and 
Mason’s eggs,101 the couple conceived a child through this assisted 
                                                                                                                                      
 95. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (1994). 
 96. Breit, 285 Va. at 170. 
 97. See infra Part III.B.; Breit, 285 Va. at 183 n.8. 
 98. Breit, 285 Va. at 171. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. In vitro fertilization (IVF) is ‘‘a complex series of procedures used to treat fertility or 
genetic problems and assist with the conception of a child. During IVF, mature eggs are 
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conception.102 Breit was ‘‘present for all stages of the in vitro fertilization 
process and continued to live with Mason throughout the resulting 
pregnancy.’’103 While the couple chose not to get married prior to the child’s 
birth, they believed visitation rights for Breit were in the best interests of the 
child and the couple executed a written custody and visitation agreement that 
gave Breit visitation rights.104 Upon the birth of L.F. in July 2009, Breit, who 
was present for the birth, was listed as the father on the child’s birth 
certificate.105 L.F. was named after extended family members of both Mason 
and Breit, and her last name was a hyphenated combination of Mason and 
Breit’s last names.106 The day after the birth, ‘‘Mason and Breit jointly 
executed a written agreement, identified as an ‘Acknowledgment of 
Paternity,’ stating that Breit [was] L.F.’s legal and biological father.’’107 The 
couple carried on normal life with Breit as the father of L.F.108 Four months 
after L.F.’s birth, however, the couple separated.109 Breit continued to pay 
child support for L.F., kept her as a beneficiary of his health insurance policy, 
and ‘‘consistently’’ visited L.F. on holidays and weekends.110 All-in-all, Breit 
maintained an active role in L.F.’s life until August 2010, when Mason 
‘‘unilaterally terminated all contact between Breit and L.F.’’111  
On August 24, 2010, Breit filed a petition for custody and visitation in the 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Virginia 
Beach.112 Mason filed a motion to dismiss.113 The court dismissed Breit’s 
                                                                                                                                      
collected (retrieved) from [a woman’s] ovaries and fertilized by sperm in a lab. Then the 
fertilized egg (embryo) or eggs are implanted in [a woman’s] uterus.’’ In Vitro Fertilization 
(IVF), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-
fertilization/basics/definition/prc-20018905 (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
 102. Breit, 285 Va. at 171.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. It is important to note here that Breit is an attorney. See Attorney Profile, BREIT 
LAW PC, http://breitlawyer.com/attorney-profile/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
 105. Breit, 285 Va. at 171. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. The case further cites joint birth announcements naming Mason and Breit as the 
parents, statements to friends and family that Breit was the father, and the fact that the couple 
continued to live together for four months following the birth. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 171-72. 
 112. Id. at 172. 
 113. Id. 
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petition without prejudice.114 In November 2010, Breit again pursued custody 
of L.F. by filing a ‘‘petition to determine parentage’’ under VA. CODE § 20-
49.2.115 Breit argued that the ‘‘acknowledgement of paternity that he and 
Mason voluntarily executed pursuant to [the Parentage Statute] created a 
final and binding parent-child legal status between Breit and L.F.’’116 Mason 
‘‘filed pleas in bar asserting that, pursuant to the Assisted Conception Statute 
and 32.1-257(D),117 Breit was not L.F.’s legal parent because he and Mason 
were never married and L.F. was conceived through assisted conception.’’118 
The court appointed a guardian ad litem for L.F., but again dismissed Breit’s 
motion and petition.119 Breit appealed and the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court’s decision. The court of appeals held that a ‘‘known sperm donor 
who, at the request of a woman to whom he is not married, donates his sperm 
for the purpose of . . . pregnancy . . . and who, together with the biological 
mother, executes an uncontested Acknowledgement of Paternity’’ under the 
Parentage Statute is ‘‘not barred’’ from pursuing parentage under the 
Commencement Statute.120 Mason appealed.121 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia was forced to consider how two seemingly contradictory Virginia 
statutes defined parentage in artificial insemination cases involving 
unmarried individuals.122  
The court’s analysis centered around Mason’s two claims: (1) that the 
court of appeals erroneously harmonized the Parentage Statute and the 
Assisted Conception Statute,123 and (2) that § 20-157, which mandates the 
                                                                                                                                      
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.2 (2008) is entitled ‘‘Commencement of action; parties; 
jurisdiction’’ and merely discusses the basics of initiating a legal action under this chapter of 
the Virginia Code.  This statute will be referred to as the ‘‘Commencement Statute’’ hereinafter. 
 116. Breit, 285 Va. at 172. 
 117. See infra note 216; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257 (1994) is entitled ‘‘Filing birth 
certificates; from whom required; signatures of parents’’ and discusses the administrative 
requirements for obtaining a birth certificate.  The Breit court briefly addressed this statute in 
its analysis, but merely concluded that the statute’s purpose was to ‘‘ensure that the 
Commonwealth’s records accurately reflect the intended parent-child relationship’’ and that 
the statute had to be interpreted in a way to ‘‘avoid[] constitutional conflict.’’ Breit, 285 Va. at 
186. 
 118. Breit, 285 Va. at 172. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Breit, 285 Va. at 172 (internal citations omitted); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.2 (2008). 
 121. Breit, 285 Va. at 173. 
 122. Id. at 174. 
 123. Breit, 285 Va. at 176; see supra Part II.B.2.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (1991). 
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Virginia law that shall control under Chapter 9 of Title 20,124 prevents the 
Parentage Statute from applying.125 The court first analyzed the Parentage 
Statute, which provides that parentage can be established by scientifically 
reliable genetic testing or a voluntary written agreement.126 Since there was a 
voluntary written agreement in this case, the court did not expand its analysis 
under this statute. Next, however, the court examined VA. CODE § 20-156127 
and the Assisted Conception Statute. The court cited the statute’s legislative 
and procedural history to conclude that the statute was ‘‘clearly . . . enacted 
to ensure that infertile married couples . . . were not threatened by parentage 
claims from third-party donors.’’128 The court cited VA. CODE § 20-164, 
which makes specific reference to the Parentage Statute. The court declared 
that certain children are considered children only of their parent or parents 
for ‘‘all purposes including, but not limited to’’ certain estate planning 
situations.129 In order to reach that holding, the Assisted Conception Statute 
and the Parentage Statute had to be ‘‘read in conjunction.’’130 After lengthy 
statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the General Assembly did 
not intend to limit parentage rights only to married individuals, and instead 
these rights extended to unmarried couples living together that had signed a 
parental agreement.131  
The court then addressed Mason’s second claim, that VA. CODE § 20-
157132 prevented the Parentage Statute from applying to the case at hand. The 
court used the explicit reference to the Parentage Statute found in VA. CODE 
§ 20-164 as a platform to expand on two ‘‘constitutional imperatives.’’133 After 
doing so, the court turned to Breit’s arguments. It quickly dismissed Breit’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-157 (1991) (‘‘The provisions of this chapter shall control, without 
exception, in any action brought in the courts of this Commonwealth to enforce or adjudicate 
any rights or responsibilities arising under this chapter.’’). Title 20 of the Virginia Code is 
entitled ‘‘Domestic Relations.’’ Chapter 9 is entitled ‘‘Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception.’’ 
 125. Breit, 285 Va. at 180; see supra Part II.B.2.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (1988). 
 126. Breit, 285 Va. at 174.  The statute also provides that parentage can be established ‘‘as 
otherwise provided in this chapter,’’ but does not expand on what that means. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-49.1 (1988); see supra Part II.B.2. 
 127. Note that VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (1997) provides ‘‘definitions’’; VA. CODE ANN. § 
20-158 (1991) discusses the parentage of children resulting from assisted conception. 
 128. Breit, 285 Va. at 175. 
 129. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (1994). 
 130. Breit, 285 Va. at 176. 
 131. Id. at 179-80. 
 132. See supra note 125. 
 133. Breit, 285 Va. at 180. 
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equal protection claim based on the Assisted Conception Statute’s differing 
treatment of male and female donors, concluding that the disparate 
treatment was a ‘‘result of biology, not discrimination.’’134 And while the court 
did conclude that the Assisted Conception Statute distinguished based on 
marital status, it held that the distinction was rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental purpose of protecting married couples from 
potential donor interference.135 However, the court moved on to Breit’s 
second argument without addressing how that legitimate government 
purpose was actually harming a biological parent’s rights under an equal 
protection argument. 
The court instead addressed Breit’s problem from a due process 
perspective and concluded that Breit had a constitutional right to ‘‘make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his child.’’136  Citing 
several United States Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Virginia cases, 
the court held that any statute challenging a parent’s fundamental rights 
would only survive constitutional scrutiny if it was ‘‘narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.’’137 The court used this standard of review in 
its statutory interpretation to conclude that the seemingly conflicting 
Virginia statutes should be read in a way that protected Breit’s constitutional 
rights to parentage.138  In short, the man who donated sperm to his long-time 
girlfriend that later resulted in the birth of a child was able to pursue parental 
rights of that child despite the objection of the biological mother.139 The court 
reiterated the Commonwealth’s ‘‘significant interest in encouraging the 
institution of marriage,’’140 but then further stated that the ‘‘governmental 
policy that encourages children to be born into families with married 
parents’’ does not ‘‘overcome the constitutionally protected due process 
interest of a responsible, involved, unmarried . . . father.’’141 The court 
concluded that ‘‘there is no compelling reason why a responsible, involved, 
                                                                                                                                      
 134. Id. at 181. 
 135. Id. at 181. 
 136. Id. at 181. 
 137. Id. at 182 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 
Va. 685 (2012); Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 (2011)). 
 138. Breit, 285 Va. at 182-83. 
 139. Id. at 183. 
 140. Id. at 181. 
 141. Id. at 183. 
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unmarried, biological parent should never be allowed to establish legal 
parentage of her or his child born as a result of assisted conception.’’142 
III.  PROBLEM 
The Breit court ultimately held that Mr. Breit could pursue custody of his 
biological child, L.F.143 Considering the purpose behind the General 
Assembly’s enacting of family law statutes in Virginia and the scientific 
studies that depict the significant impact that a solid family structure has on 
developing children, it is easy to conclude that the court made the best 
decision possible in this case.144 The Breit court suggested that the outcome 
of the case would have been different had two different factual scenarios 
played out: (1) the Acknowledgement of Paternity had not been signed, or 
(2) either parent had changed their marital status.145 Both scenarios are 
addressed below.  
A. Lack of Acknowledgement of Paternity 
Essentially, the decision in Breit rested on the written acknowledgment of 
paternity signed by both Mr. Breit and Ms. Mason in accordance with the 
Parentage Statute.146 The court acknowledged that the biological ties that Mr. 
Breit had to the child were not enough to establish legal paternity.147 If that 
were the case, sperm and egg donors could always make claims of paternity 
                                                                                                                                      
 142. Id. Interestingly, the Breit court never cited Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
or Bottoms v. Bottoms.  The court only cited Michael H. v. Gerald D. in a footnote and 
explained it simply as a case in which a ‘‘biological father who spent a short amount of time as 
the mother’s live-in boyfriend sought to establish paternity after the mother had reconciled 
with her husband.’’  Breit, 285 Va. at 183 n.8.  The court did cite Troxel and Wyatt, but only 
for the assertion that ‘‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by 
[the U.S. Supreme Court]’’ is the ‘‘parent’s right to form a relationship with his or her child.’’ 
Breit, 285 Va. at 182.  The court also cited Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), to conclude 
that ‘‘parental rights do not arise solely from the biological connection between a parent and 
child.’’ Breit, 285 Va. at 182.  Given the facts at hand, these limited citations to fundamental 
case law are probably appropriate; the court established that parental rights were fundamental.  
It does seem odd, however, that in a case with such far reaching consequences regarding a 
constitutionally-protected, fundamental right, the court’s analysis of U.S. Supreme Court and 
Supreme Court of Virginia case law is limited to four cases and two paragraphs of analysis. See 
id. 
 143. Breit, 285 Va. at 182-183.  
 144. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 145. Breit, 285 Va. at 179. 
 146. Id.; see supra Part II.B.1.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (1988). 
 147. Breit, 285 Va. at 179. 
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and essentially destroy an otherwise functioning family unit. The court cites 
this occurrence as the policy goal behind the Assisted Conception Statute, 
further ensuring ‘‘that a married couple could obtain sperm from an outside 
donor without fear that the donor would claim parental rights.’’148  
This case raises an interesting predicament, because the average 
unmarried couple attempting to have children through artificial 
insemination is not likely to have knowledge of the statutory paternity 
acknowledgement requirement. If biological ties are not enough to establish 
legal paternity in artificial insemination cases, and if both parties are 
unfamiliar with the only other clearly defined statutory way to establish legal 
paternity in Virginia, how is legal paternity established where these written 
agreements are not in place? 
Anonymous sperm donors typically waive ‘‘all parental rights and 
responsibilities to children conceived from the purchase from their sperm.’’149 
Further, ‘‘[b]y signing, donors assume no responsibility or liability for any 
offspring conceived through donor semen; donors will have no rights to any 
offspring conceived.’’150 However, this waiver of parental rights may not 
always be desired, especially where the parties know each other and both 
intend to act as parents to the child. It also would not apply in cases of 
informal artificial insemination where the use of a sperm bank is not a factor. 
Thankfully, a Virginia circuit court seems to have remedied the disparity, 
albeit in the context of a very Modern Family arrangement.  In Boardwine v. 
Bruce, the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke allowed a biological father, a 
gay man who donated sperm to his lesbian friend which she used to 
impregnate herself through the use of a turkey baster, to establish legal 
paternity of a child without having a signed acknowledgement of paternity 
because (1) the Assisted Conception Statute did not apply because the 
artificial insemination by turkey baster did not include the assistance of a 
physician under VA. CODE § 20-156, (2) genetic testing confirmed the father’s 
paternity, and (3) ‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ demonstrated that the 
parties intended him to be the father, in accordance with VA. CODE § 20-
49.4.151  
                                                                                                                                      
 148. Id. at 175. 
 149. Sperm Donor FAQs, BEASPERMDONOR.COM, 
http://www.beaspermdonor.com/spermdonorfaqs.shtml#legalities (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Boardwine v. Bruce, 88 Va. Cir. 218 (2014); see supra Part II.B.; see infra Part IV.A. 
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B. Change in Marital Status of Either Parent 
The Breit court further suggested a factual scenario that would have 
produced a different result in L.F. v. Breit. In footnote eight, the court 
rebutted Mason’s application of Michael H.,152 stating that:  
[I]n [Michael H.] . . . [t]he Supreme Court refused to recognize a 
liberty interest on behalf of the boyfriend, holding that 
relationships between children and adulterous fathers should not 
be constitutionally protected given society’s historical interest in 
safeguarding the family institution. . . . [But] [i]nterference with 
the family institution is not at issue here: Mason and Breit 
represent the closest thing L.F. has to a ‘family unit,’ as Mason has 
no husband to claim parentage over Breit.’’153 
The court suggested that if Mason had been married, the case might have 
turned out differently. This logic seems to align with the court’s 
acknowledgment that ‘‘[a] governmental policy that encourages children to 
be born into families with married parents is legitimate,’’154 but also has 
overreaching impacts on the biological father. If, for instance, the marital 
status of the biological mother changed over the course of time, would that 
impact the biological father’s custody or visitation of his child? Would it be 
possible for a biological mother to get married to an otherwise absent man 
solely to preclude the biological father from ever having custody of his child? 
On the other hand, would it make a difference if the biological mother (or 
father for that matter) had reestablished a stable living environment for the 
child, complete with a loving spouse, other children to interact with, and a 
presumed stable economic standing while the other biological parent 
remained unmarried (or possibly divorced several times)? Could it be in the 
best interest of the child to grow up in a two-parent family environment as 
opposed to a single-parent household? Unlike the Acknowledgment of 
Paternity issue that seems to be addressed in Boardwine,155 the marital status 
problem has yet to be addressed by the courts or legislature. 
There are significant benefits to children in an otherwise healthy, two-
parent, heterosexual family unit (as discussed below), but Virginia courts are 
not required to consider either parents’ marital status when evaluating the 
best interest of the child under the Best Interest Statute.156 Not every 
                                                                                                                                      
 152. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 153. Breit, 285 Va. at 183 n.8 (internal citations omitted). 
 154. Id. at 183. 
 155. See supra Part III.A. 
 156. See supra Part II.B.3.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (1994). 
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jurisdiction takes the same approach. In Oregon, for instance, judges are 
allowed to consider the marital status of either party to a custody suit if it is 
shown that the marital status is causing or may cause emotional or physical 
damage to the child.157 
1. Scientific Research 
Virginia courts should be required to consider the marital status of those 
pursuing custody and parental rights in considering the best interests of the 
child.  There have been countless studies on the impacts that divorce, single-
parent homes, and homosexual parenting have on children.  They are briefly 
summarized below.   
It is important to note that there is a significant amount of emerging bias 
in this area of study.  The impact of divorce and single-parent homes is largely 
uncontested and spans across the political aisle.158  Homosexual parenting, 
however, is a relatively new concept.  While generation after generation have 
felt the impacts of divorce and single-parenting, even the most liberal 
estimates cite homosexual parenting as having only started to become more 
mainstream in the past forty years or so.159  As such, legitimate studies on the 
subject are limited in number.160 While I find it hard to believe that 
homosexual parenting could have any less significant impacts on children 
than divorce or single-parent homes, the studies face significant bias.161 Even 
people raised by homosexual parents and those directly impacted cannot 
agree on whether their home-life was healthy and beneficial.162 At the very 
                                                                                                                                      
 157. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (1975). 
 158. See infra Parts III.B.1.a., III.B.1.b. 
 159. Milestones in LGBT Parenting History, WASHINGTON BLADE (Oct. 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/10/11/milestones-in-lgbt-parenting-history/. 
 160. See infra Part III.B.1.c.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Compare Katy Faust, Dear Justice Kennedy: An Open Letter From the Child of a Loving 
Gay Parent, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/02/14370/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (claiming that 
‘‘same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are wholly unequal and should be treated 
differently for the sake of the children’’ and that ‘‘redefining marriage [to include same-sex 
couples] would actually serve to strip [children of gay parents] of their most fundamental 
rights’’), and Janna Darnelle, Breaking the Silence: Redefining Marriage Hurts Women Like Me 
-- and Our Children, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/09/13692/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (arguing that 
her children, who the court gave to her ex-husband after he ‘‘came out’’ as gay face identity 
issues that are ‘‘deep and unique’’), with Iowa Democrats, ZachWahls Speaks About Family, 
YOUTUBE.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), 
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least, this is a subject the courts should approach with caution; our nation’s 
children should not be thrust into situations of unknown consequences 
merely to ensure we’re ‘‘keeping up with the Joneses.’’ 
a. Impacts of Divorce on Children 
According to the Family Research Council, ‘‘[i]n 2001, the divorce rate was 
almost double that of 1960. [In 2004], 40 to 50 percent of marriages [were] 
likely to end in divorce, with second and subsequent marriages having an 
even higher likelihood of divorce than first marriages.’’163 While there are 
many reasons for these divorces to take place, the effects divorce has on 
children are significant.164 The Family Research Council cites emotional and 
behavioral problems,165 lower educational attainment,166 illegal drug use,167 
and cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing168 as some of the effects 
divorce has on children. The Council further cites depression and suicide,169 
                                                                                                                                      
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSQQK2Vuf9Q (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (depicting 
activist Zach Wahls testifying before the Iowa House of Representatives claiming ‘‘I was raised 
by a gay couple, and I’m doin’ pretty well.’’) (timestamp 1:25). 
 163. Bridget Maher, Deterring Divorce, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL 3 (2004), 
http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04E17.pdf.  
 164. Id. at 7-9. 
 165. Id. at 7-8 (‘‘A 2002 study found that, compared to children with married parents, 
children with divorced parents are more likely to have behavior problems, such as aggression 
of acting out. A 1999 study found a higher incidence of depression and delinquency among 
children whose parents had divorced.’’). 
 166. Id. at 8 (‘‘Compared to children raised by widowed mothers, children from divorced 
single-mother homes are significantly less likely to complete high school and to attend or to 
graduate from college, according to a 2000 study.’’). 
 167. Id. (‘‘A 2003 study found that compared to persons from intact families, those who 
experienced parental divorce are one-and-a-half times more likely to use illegal drugs by age 
14 and more likely to use illicit drugs at any age.’’).  
 168. Id. (‘‘A 2004 study found that young women who experience parental divorce are 
twice as likely to cohabit before marriage and to have a child out of wedlock, when compared 
to those raised by their married biological parents.’’). 
 169. Id. at 8-9 (‘‘A 2003 study found that those who experienced parental divorce by age 
seven were twice as likely to suffer from major depression as adults (regardless of whether their 
mother remarried), compared to those raised in intact families. Other research found that 
compared to those raised in intact families, adults who had experienced parental separation 
or divorce in childhood were twice as likely to attempt suicide.’’). 
2015] LEAVE IT TO BEAVER MEETS MODERN FAMILY 69 
 
lower economic achievement,170 higher risk of divorce,171 and weak family 
relationships172 as lasting effects that children of divorce continue to 
experience as adults. 
b. Impacts of Single Parenting on Children 
There is ample research discussing the challenges children face in single-
parent homes compared with children in married-parent homes.173 Research 
conducted by Professor Paul R. Amato, the Arnold and Bette Hoffman 
Professor of Family Sociology and Demography at Pennsylvania State 
University, states that, when compared to children raised in married-parent 
homes, children raised outside of marriage face adulthood with ‘‘less 
education, earn less income, have lower occupational status, are more likely 
to be idle (that is, not employed and not in school), are more likely to have a 
nonmarital birth (among daughters), have more troubled marriages, 
experience higher rates of divorce, and report more symptoms of 
depression.’’174 Other studies show that children raised in single-parent 
homes, when compared to children raised in families with two parents, are 
twice as likely to attempt suicide,175 two to three times more likely to try 
marijuana,176 and generally more likely to be physically or sexually abused.177 
                                                                                                                                      
 170. Id. at 9 (‘‘Compared to children raised by widowed mothers, adults who grew up in 
divorced single-mother homes are more likely to take lower status jobs and less likely to report 
happiness in adulthood.’’). 
 171. Id. (‘‘Children of divorce are twice as likely to divorce as are the offspring of 
continuously married parents, according to a national longitudinal study of two generations. 
The authors suggest that their higher risk of divorce is due to a weaker commitment to lifelong 
marriage.’’). 
 172. Id. (‘‘Adults who have experienced parental divorce are less likely to have frequent 
contact and close relationships with their parents than are adult children from intact 
families.’’). 
 173. See W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Reforming Parentage Laws: 
Bringing up Baby: Adoption, Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RTS. J. 883, 883 (2006). 
 174. Id. at 892 (citing Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the 
Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 75, 
78 (2005)). 
 175. Id. (citing Gunilla Ringback Weitoft et al., Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in 
Children Living with Single Parents in Sweden: A Popluation-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289 
(2003)). 
 176. Id. at 892-93 (citing Robert L. Flewelling & Karl E. Bauman, Family Structure as a 
Predictor of Initial Substance Use and Sexual Intercourse in Adolescence, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
171, 176 (1990)). 
 177. Id. at 894 (internal citations omitted). 
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c. Impacts of Homosexual Parenting on Children 
In addition to divorce and single-parenting, homosexual parenting is on 
the rise and is affecting children in the process.  Unfortunately, the studies of 
homosexual parenting are not as conclusive as the studies of single parenting, 
but not for the reasons the pro-homosexual movement would like us to 
believe. A significant number of studies regarding the impacts of homosexual 
parenting on children have been conducted, but most seem to contain the 
same common flaws: bias, oversimplification of sample data, and the 
assumption that one can self-recognize subconscious developmental issues. 
Lynn Wardle, a professor of law at the J. Reuben Clark School of Law, 
Brigham Young University, conducted a review of homosexual parenting 
research from a legal perspective.178 In doing so, he identified multiple 
concerns with the research present at the time of his publishing. 
Unfortunately, most of those concerns have yet to be addressed in more 
modern studies and, as a result, their validity can still be called into 
question.179 Wardle points out that, 
[t]he ‘‘social desirability’’ bias taints the studies of homosexual 
parenting. Both researchers and respondents perceive that within 
society, or at least the subgroup of society with which they 
identify, it is deemed desirable, progressive, and enlightened to 
support one particular outcome----in this case, that homosexual 
parenting is just as good as heterosexual parenting.180 
This bias is prevalent in the research currently being conducted on the 
topic. Despite its publication in the American Sociological Review and the 
authors’ affiliation with the nationally recognized Department of Sociology 
at the University of Southern California, one such study admits its bias quite 
clearly, claiming that ‘‘social prejudice and institutionalized discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men . . . exerts a powerful policing effect on the basic 
terms of psychological research . . . .’’181 The study goes on to coin the phrase 
‘‘heterosexism’’ and to call the literature and research that supports 
                                                                                                                                      
 178. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997). 
 179. See Walter R. Schumm, Are Two Lesbian Parents Better Than a Mom and Dad? Logical 
and Methodological Flaws in Recent Studies Affirming the Superiority of Lesbian Parenthood, 
10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 79, 117 (2011) (‘‘It appears clear that value biases have dramatically 
influenced how social scientists: evaluate scientific literature, develop their theoretical models, 
and conduct their research in the area of lesbigay parenting.’’). 
 180. Wardle, supra note 178, at 848. 
 181. Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents 
Matter?, 66 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV., NO. 2, 159, 160 (2001). 
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homosexual parenting and its supposed nonexistent impact on children ‘‘far 
more responsible.’’182 Their bias is unquestionable, but many other 
researchers have used their work as a foundation for further study. Fiona 
Tasker based her entire study published in the Journal of Marriage and 
Family on validating the claims made by Stacey and Biblarz.183 
In addition to obvious bias, Wardle also states that small sample size and 
‘‘samples of convenience’’ used during research are areas of further concern 
and lead to an oversimplification of sample data.184 Again, the tendencies to 
examine small sample sizes and gather a ‘‘sample of convenience,’’ that is, a 
sample made up of ‘‘self-selected, or at least not randomly selected’’ subjects, 
has not changed in modern research.185 Wardle cited a study unrelated to 
homosexual parenting conducted in 1996 that examined the effect of ‘‘at risk’’ 
factors on children’s welfare that included ‘‘a survey of 34,129 children from 
an initial sample of 250,000 surveys taken in 460 communities in thirty-two 
states.’’186 The largest modern study found for the purposes of this note 
involved only 2,269 people;187 most included far fewer.188 In addition to small 
sample sizes, much of the research being conducted on this topic involves 
‘‘self-selected’’ sample groups.189 Given the often heated and passionate 
debate surrounding this topic in modern society, it is reasonable to assume 
that societal-driven pressure to conform to the standards of that society may 
dissuade some from ‘‘questionable’’ backgrounds to participate in public 
research. In addition, without randomly generated sample groups, it is easy 
to question the motives of those participants choosing to take part in research 
surveys. As Wardle points out, ‘‘educated, economically stable white lesbians 
are typically overrepresented in the trendy samples; poor, minority, 
uneducated, or troubled homosexuals are seldom included. Gay male couples 
typically are not included.’’190 Many of these concerns have yet to be 
addressed in modern research.191 
                                                                                                                                      
 182. Id. at 162. 
 183. Fiona Tasker, Same-Sex Parenting and Child Development: Reviewing the 
Contribution of Parental Gender, 72 J.OF MARRIAGE AND FAM. 1, 35 (2010). 
 184. Wardle, supra note 178, at 846. 
 185. Id.; Schumm, supra note 179, at 87. 
 186. Wardle, supra note 178, at 846. 
 187. Mark Henrickson, Lavender Parents, 26 SOC. POL’Y J. OF N.Z. 68, 70 (2005). 
 188. A study from Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia was comprised of just nine 
people. See J. Pennington & T. Knight, Through the Lens of Hetero-Normative Assumptions: 
Re-thinking Attitudes Towards Gay Parenting, 13 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 1, 59 (2011). 
 189. Wardle, supra note 178, at 846-47. 
 190. Id. at 847. 
 191. See Schumm, supra note 179. 
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In addition to bias and concerns with the research sample groups, most 
research on this topic is conducted through surveys and, thus, makes the 
assumption that one can recognize subconscious developmental issues in 
himself. Psychologist Jean Piaget’s, physician Sigmund Freud’s, and 
psychoanalyst Erik Erikson’s theories prove otherwise.192  Their theories form 
modern thought on human development, and all studied the subconscious 
cognitive development of humans.193 Obviously, these studies were done 
from a third-party perspective; it would be impossible to ask an infant his 
exact feelings about a situation and the impact his surroundings had on his 
development. One could assume an infant’s feelings by observing his 
behavior, but it is impossible to achieve complete accuracy. Likewise, it is 
unreasonable to assume that someone understands his current ‘‘stage’’ of 
development and the challenges he may be facing on the subconscious level 
as they compare to other people’s development. Research based completely 
on surveys assumes that the subject is consciously aware of his subconscious 
state of mind. 
Recognizing the impacts of divorce, single-parenting, and homosexual 
parenting on children, let us return to the hypothetical Dan and Susan 
discussed at the beginning of this note and assess how these impacts relate to 
the case. 
IV.  SOLUTION 
Recall Dan’s plight in attempting to regain custody of Timmy after 
Timmy’s mother, Dan’s long-time partner, ran off. Considering the historical 
background and current Virginia law as determined by the General Assembly 
and the Supreme Court of Virginia, Dan seems left with nothing more than 
uncertainty in his case. Two simple changes to current legislation, however, 
could provide Dan at least a little more peace at heart.194 
A. Acknowledging Clear and Convincing Evidence of Paternal Intent to 
Establish Parentage 
As mentioned, the Virginia General Assembly has yet to address custody 
of children conceived through artificial insemination by unmarried parents 
                                                                                                                                      
 192. See ROBERT S. FELDMAN, DEVELOPMENT ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 13-22 (6th ed. 2010). 
 193. Id. 
 194. It is important to note here that this note does not attempt to address the differences 
between awarding parental rights and custody or visitation.  Unfortunately, the two are not 
equal in society, and parental rights are not always pursued with the purest of intentions. 
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who have not signed an Acknowledgment of Paternity.195 The Supreme Court 
of Virginia has yet to address this issue either. Recall, however, the Circuit 
Court of the City of Roanoke’s holding in Boardwine v. Bruce that allowed an 
unmarried man to establish legal paternity over a child who was conceived 
through at-home artificial insemination using the man’s sperm, even without 
an Acknowledgment of Paternity, through clear and convincing evidence 
that the parties intended him to be the child’s father.196 In reaching this 
                                                                                                                                      
 195. The Virginia Department of Vital Records, the issuing authority of birth certificates 
in the Commonwealth, does require an Acknowledgment of Paternity Form (Form VS22) for 
the biological father’s name to be included on the birth certificate if the biological parents are 
not married at the time of the child’s birth. The form must be signed by both parents and 
signed before a notary public. See VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, VITAL RECORDS, VA. 
CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (1994) also provides, 
 If the mother of a child is not married to the natural father of the child at the 
time of birth or was not married to the natural father at any time during the ten 
months next preceding such birth, the name of the father shall not be entered on 
the certificate of birth without a sworn acknowledgment of paternity, executed 
subsequent to the birth of the child, of both the mother and of the person to be 
named as the father. In any case in which a final determination of the paternity 
of a child has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to § 20-
49.8, from which no appeal has been taken and for which the time allowed to 
perfect an appeal has expired, the name of the father and the surname of the child 
shall be entered on the certificate of birth in accordance with the finding and 
order of the court.  
 Children born of marriages prohibited by law, deemed null or void or dissolved 
by a court shall nevertheless be legitimate and the birth certificate for such 
children shall contain full information concerning the father.  
 For the purpose of birth registration in the case of a child resulting from 
assisted conception, pursuant to Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq.) of Title 20, the birth 
certificate of such child shall contain full information concerning the mother’s 
husband as the father of the child and the gestational mother as the mother of 
the child. Donors of sperm or ova shall not have any parental rights or duties for 
any such child.  
 In the event any person desires to have the name of the father entered on the 
certificate of birth based upon the judgment of paternity of a court of another 
state, such person shall apply to an appropriate court of the Commonwealth for 
an order reflecting that such court has reviewed such judgment of paternity and 
has determined that such judgment of paternity was amply supported in 
evidence and legitimate for the purposes of Article IV, Section 1 of the United 
States Constitution.  
 If the order of paternity should be appealed, the registrar shall not enter the 
name of the alleged father on the certificate of birth during the pendency of such 
appeal. If the father is not named on the certificate of birth, no other information 
concerning the father shall be entered on the certificate. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 196. See Boardwine v. Bruce, 88 Va. Cir. 218 (2014). 
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holding, the court first determined that Virginia’s Assisted Conception 
Statute did not apply to the facts of the case because the artificial 
insemination was completed without the assistance of a physician.197 Citing 
Breit, the court further held that, since the Assisted Conception Statute did 
not apply, the Parentage Statute allowed for the father to establish parental 
rights by clear and convincing evidence.198 
The Boardwine court provides insight into the proper method of 
determining parentage when an Acknowledgement of Paternity is not 
present, but its reasoning falls short of addressing all possible situations 
involving the birth of a child through artificial insemination using donations 
from unmarried, but devoted, couples. In Breit, the court held that the 
Assisted Conception Statute and the Parentage Statute should be read to 
coincide with one another as much as possible, but the court only addressed 
a situation in which an Acknowledgment of Paternity was signed.199  
To remedy the otherwise confusing statutory interpretation, the Assisted 
Conception Statute should be amended to codify judicial reasoning with 
specific reference to the Parentage Statute and allow for parentage of children 
conceived through artificial insemination to be determined by genetics, an 
Acknowledgment of Paternity, or clear and convincing evidence that the 
parties intended for each other to be the parents of the child.200  The current 
‘‘as otherwise provided in this chapter’’ standard in the Parentage Statute has 
created confusion throughout the court system.201 
B. Mandatory Consideration of Marriage in Best Interest of the Child 
Analysis 
In addition to the Assisted Conception Statute mentioned above, the Best 
Interest of the Child Statute needs revision.  Given the research above 
regarding the developmental impacts of divorce, single-parent homes, and 
homosexual parenting, the marital and familial status of either parent should 
                                                                                                                                      
 197. Id. I do not see the practical distinction made in Boardwine between artificial 
insemination conducted under the supervision of a medical professional and artificial 
insemination conducted in one’s living room. The distinction in Boardwine seems to be more 
of an effort to avoid having to apply the Assisted Conception Statute to that case given the 
complex statutory interpretation required by Breit. See supra Part II.C.  As such, I recommend 
this addition of ‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ to all artificial insemination cases.  
 198. Boardwine, 88 Va. Cir. at 233. 
 199. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 178 (2013). 
 200. The clear and convincing standard comes from the Parentage Statute’s reference to 
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.4. I would also recommend the Parentage Statute be amended with 
specific reference to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.4. 
 201. See supra Part II.B.1.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (1988). 
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be considered when determining custody and visitation. As such, the marital 
and familial status (that is, the parent’s relationship history, sexual 
orientation, and current marital status, etc.) should be added as the eleventh 
factor under the Best Interest Statute that Virginia courts must consider 
when determining custody and visitation.202  
This addition would not be a novel concept. Montana, for instance, 
currently lists marital status as a factor to be considered in the best interest 
of the child analysis for adoption purposes.203 In fact, Virginia courts have 
alluded to this principle already. In Hughes v. Hughes, the Court of Appeals 
of Virginia addressed whether a mother’s living with another man to whom 
she was not married was enough to revoke her custody rights.204 While the 
Hughes court held that it was not, the court explained that, ‘‘exposing [our] 
children to their parents’ living with persons to whom they are not married 
has been disfavored by our Supreme Court.’’205 In Brown v. Brown, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a mother’s adulterous relationship 
rendered her an unfit parent.206 The court went one-step further and 
acknowledged that ‘‘the moral climate in which children are to be raised is an 
important consideration for the court in determining custody, and adultery 
is a reflection of the mother’s moral values. An illicit relationship to which 
minor children are exposed cannot be condoned.’’207 Surely the court would 
not have held the same way if the mother and her lover were, in fact, married. 
The court has alluded to its desire to consider marital status of parents in 
custody cases. Perhaps it’s time the General Assembly consider it as well. 
It is also important to note that I recommend this consideration be 
included as a factor in a custody or visitation dispute, not a decisive element. 
As suggested above, a ‘‘hard and fast’’ rule preferring married parents to 
unmarried parents could lead to further destruction of the family unit.208 A 
child’s relationship with a stepparent may not be as strong as that child’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 202. I think it important to remind the reader that not all custody arrangements take place 
immediately following a divorce. At first glance, it seems odd to require courts to consider the 
marital status of either parent who are in the midst of a custody battle given their likely recent 
divorce. These best interest factors, however, are considered any time the court is determining 
the best interest of a child for ‘‘purposes of determining child custody or visitation 
arrangements.’’ VA. CODE ANN. §20-124.3 (2014). 
 203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-201 (2014). 
 204. Hughes v. Hughes, No. 2565-97-2, 1998 WL 463323, at *1-2 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 
1998). 
 205. Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196 (1977)).  
 206. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199-201 (1977). 
 207. Id. at 199. 
 208. See supra Part III.B. 
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relationship with her biological parents. Further, just because people are 
married does not mean they maintain a healthy living environment for 
children. The potential for abuse, abandonment, and neglect are still very 
present dangers. That said, the benefits that a married household can provide 
are substantial and should at least be considered when evaluating the best 
interests of a child. To completely ignore either parent’s current marital and 
familial status, and only look to the interaction between the biological parents 
and the child, leaves a gaping hole in the ‘‘best interest’’ consideration.209 
V. CONCLUSION 
As current Virginia law stands, our friend Dan is left with a lot of 
uncertainty regarding his parental rights in relation to Timmy. As the 
Commonwealth of Virginia decides what elements of the traditional family 
unit it wants to protect, there are custody disputes being decided daily using 
confusing and unclear standards that do not promote those elements that the 
Commonwealth, and the United States for that matter, has determined are 
fundamental. Virginia’s General Assembly should make the Assisted 
Conception Statute more clear by specifically allowing clear and convincing 
evidence of the biological parents’ intent regarding the parentage of their 
children to establish parentage over children conceived through artificial 
insemination. Further, given the severe and substantial effects on a child’s 
development associated with divorced parents, single-parent homes, or 
homosexual parents, the General Assembly should add marital and familial 
status of the individuals seeking custody or visitation to the factors the courts 
must consider when determining the best interests of a child.  
The legislature and the courts have expressed the desire to preserve the 
Leave it to Beaver traditional family unit, but the break-down of the ‘‘modern 
family’’ and technological advances have forced the need to adapt our laws to 
explicitly preserve what we desire to preserve; our reliance on societal moral 
standards is no longer working. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 209. I also acknowledge that the ‘‘best interest v. parental rights’’ debate is far from settled, 
but that debate is also beyond the scope of this note.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
